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*Adam G. Unikowsky, a partner in the Litigation Department at Jenner & Block, is also a
member of the firm’s Appellate and Supreme Court, Communications, and Technology
Litigation Practices. He has won seven cases in the Supreme Court.
1. ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016) (argued January 13, 2016).
2. Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1867, 1870 (explaining that “two prosecutions . . . are
not for the same offense if brought by different sovereigns—even when those actions target
the identical criminal conduct through equivalent criminal laws” because the defendant has
“by one act . . . committed two offences” (citation omitted)).
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My first Supreme Court argument was in Puerto Rico v.
Sánchez Valle.1 The case concerned the dual-sovereignty
exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause. As every schoolkid
learns, the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents criminal defendants
from being tried twice for the same crime. As not every
schoolkid learns, that rule does not apply when the successive
prosecutions are by different sovereigns. The Supreme Court has
held that states are different sovereigns from the federal
government—which means that if a person’s conduct violates
both federal and state law, he can be separately tried and
sentenced in both federal and state court.2 In Sánchez Valle, the
question presented was whether Puerto Rico—a U.S. territory—
was a different sovereign from the United States, such that
successive prosecutions by the federal government and Puerto
Rico for the same conduct did not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
I could not have asked for a better first Supreme Court
case. Sánchez Valle presented a profound question of
constitutional law: What constitutes a sovereign? It required a
deep dive into history that included, for instance, comparing the
creation of the Puerto Rico Constitution with the events
surrounding the states’ entrance into the union. It was both
symbolically important and of practical importance to the
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administration of justice. And, of course, the case was of the
greatest practical importance to my two clients, who faced years
of additional imprisonment if Puerto Rico was permitted to
prosecute them for crimes for which they had already served
time. It was an incredible privilege to litigate the case in the
Supreme Court.
Predictably, I prepared obsessively for the oral argument,
doing three moot courts and spending most of my waking hours
figuring out how I would respond to off-the-wall questions. The
oral argument itself was a blur. I got out my first line—“Under
the Constitution, states are sovereign, but territories are not”—
which in retrospect might have been a bit trite. I got out a few
more words and then the questions began. As in many a
Supreme Court argument, my experience consisted of listening
nervously to often lengthy questions that I wasn’t sure I
understood; stammering out a few words in response; and then
being interrupted with another lengthy question. My fifteen
minutes went by very quickly, but I sat down thinking that I
hadn’t affirmatively lost the case for my clients. In the end the
Court went our way by a six-to-two vote.
I very much doubt that my oral argument made an
impression on the Justices, but it certainly made an impression
on me. Of course I wanted to go up there again. I began reading
reported decisions to try to find one that might interest the
Supreme Court, and I got lucky. Three lawyers agreed to let me
file petitions for certiorari challenging adverse decisions. By a
quirk of scheduling, the three petitions were scheduled for
Conference in rapid succession, and then the Supreme Court
granted all three. This meant that I would be arguing three
Supreme Court cases in the span of a month. Uh-oh.
The next few months were busy. Preparing opening and
reply briefs in three cases takes time. Of course, I had work for
other clients that I couldn’t leave by the wayside. And all was
not quiet on the home front, with two young kids who were not
interested in my litigation calendar and our third child due two
weeks after the third oral argument.
But as I prepared the briefs, I realized that I was even
luckier than I thought. I had stumbled onto three cases in which
the legal positions I would be taking were unusually compelling.
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3. ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1400 (2017) (argued March 20, 2017).
4. ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1626 (2017) (argued March 29, 2017).
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I have always found it unseemly for lawyers to take too
much credit for Supreme Court wins. Supreme Court litigation is
not a moot court competition. The Supreme Court rules for the
better case, not the better lawyer. And for good reason—the
whole premise of the certiorari process is that the Court takes
cases that are important to the country, not just to the litigants.
Indeed, it is customary for cert petitions to characterize cases as
good vehicles for resolving broader issues that affect other
litigants. So it would seem unfair to have those others lose their
rights because someone else—the person who took the issue to
the Supreme Court first—hired a bad lawyer. Of course having a
good lawyer helps convince the Court about the strength of a
case, but the Justices really do try their best to look past the
quality of the lawyering and get to the right answer.
This makes Supreme Court litigation particularly rewarding
when you are lucky enough to stumble across a winning case.
And I was lucky, cubed. I had stumbled across three winning
cases.
The first case, Howell v. Howell,3 was a military divorce
dispute in which I represented a veteran against his ex-wife.
Federal law provides that a veteran can get a pension or
disability pay, but not both; if a veteran starts receiving
disability pay, he waives a corresponding portion of his pension.
Federal law also provides that a divorce court can divide a
veteran’s pension, but not disability pay. A divorce court had
divided Mr. Howell’s pension, and he later waived a portion of
his pension to receive disability pay. The divorce court then
ordered him to pay his ex-wife an amount that would ensure that
she was getting the same monthly amount that she had received
when he was paying her solely out of his pension. When you
work through the math, you realize that this order is dollar-fordollar identical to an order dividing Mr. Howell’s disability pay,
which is prohibited under federal law. Yet the Supreme Court of
Arizona nonetheless held that the order did not violate federal
law. This just couldn’t be right.
The second case, Honeycutt v. United States,4 concerned
whether co-conspirators are jointly and severally liable for
forfeiture orders when only one conspirator actually got the
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5. ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017) (argued April 18, 2017).
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money. Nothing in the federal statute at issue provided for joint
and several liability. Indeed, the statute was clearly directed at
ensuring the forfeiture of tainted property directly implicated in
crime—which is inconsistent with imposing forfeiture orders on
co-conspirators who never received tainted property.
The third case, Kokesh v. SEC,5 concerned whether there
was a statute of limitations for the SEC’s implied disgorgement
remedy. Disgorgement is an implied remedy, so, not
surprisingly, there is no express statute of limitations. An old
statute provided a general five-year statute of limitations that
applied in actions for penalties or forfeitures, so the question
was whether disgorgement fell into either category. The SEC
took the position that disgorgement was neither a penalty nor a
forfeiture, so there was no statute of limitations whatsoever. Of
course, the reason Congress hadn’t enacted a statute of
limitations was that disgorgement was an implied remedy. So
the SEC’s position boiled down to the theory that not only could
the government create implied remedies, but it could ensure that
those remedies were subject to no limitations period precisely
because they are implied. I did not think the Supreme Court
would go for that.
So I felt good about my cases. Well, not that good. I was up
against the government in all three cases—in Honeywell and
Kokesh, the government was the opposing party—and in
Howell, the government had filed an amicus brief on the exspouse’s side. In all three cases, not only the courts below, but
also most other courts, had ruled against my position. In
Honeycutt, the one case in which I truly felt certain that the
government’s position was wrong, there was actually a nine-toone circuit split in the government’s favor. I was worried that
my assessment of our positions reflected unconscious hubris.
(Consciously, at least, I was extremely nervous.) I was also
aware that lawyers routinely insist publicly, and believe
privately, that they’re going to win, only to be shocked by the
outrageous decisions against them. I didn’t want to be one of
those lawyers.
But it worked out. The oral arguments were a bit
anticlimactic, which was a good thing. In Howell I sat down
with something like thirteen minutes left, having gotten only a
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few polite questions from the bench. In Honeycutt I don’t think I
got a single hostile question, and sat down fifteen minutes early.
My primary regret in both cases is that I droned on too long in
rebuttal. The bench was more active in Kokesh, but the Justices
were much harder on my opponent. In the end, the Court ruled
for my clients in all three cases without dissent.
I definitely didn’t win the cases because of my oral
arguments. My clients won the cases because, on the law, they
deserved to win. I just went along for the ride, but it was a great
ride.
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